This paper reexamines the role of open market operations for short-run e¤ects of monetary policy in a New Keynesian framework. The central bank supplies money in exchange for securities that are discounted with the short-run nominal interest rate, while money demand is induced by a liquidity constraint. We allow for a legal restriction by which only government bonds are eligible. Their supply is bounded by scal policy that is assumed to be Ricardian. If public debt is dominated in rate of return by private debt, open market operations matter, and an endogenous liquidity premium and a liquidity e¤ect arise. Nominal interest rate setting (including a peg) is then associated with price level and equilibrium uniqueness, regardless whether prices are exible or set in a staggered way. Thus, the legal restriction overcomes indeterminacies due to an unbounded money supply, as implied by the real bills doctrine. Moreover, it facilitates constant money growth and interest rate policy to be equivalent. JEL classication: E52, E32.
Introduction
Central banks in most industrial countries conduct monetary policy mainly via open market operations, where money is supplied in exchange for risk free securities discounted with a short-run nominal interest rate. Hence, the costs of cash acquisition depend on the current discount rate and the availability of collateral. Monetary theory, however, has not reached a consensus on the e¤ects of open market operations and even claims that they are irrelevant, as for example shown by Wallace (1981) and Sargent and Smith (1987) , or Eggerston and Woodford (2003) . 3 In accordance with the latter view, the majority of recent contributions to the monetary policy literature abstracts from an explicit specication of open market operations and assumes that money is injected via lump-sum transfers. In this paper open market operations are (re)introduced in a standard monetary business cycle framework and it is shown that the relevance of open market operations depends on whether the set of eligible securities is restricted or not. In particular, when only government bonds are accepted in open market operations, the liquidity puzzle can be resolved and an endogenous liquidity premium on non-eligible securities can be generated. Further, a binding legal restriction avoids price level indeterminacy and equilibrium multiplicity that arise for interest rate policies accompanied by an unbounded money supply and leads to an equivalence between simple money supply and interest rate rules.
The analysis is conducted in an innite horizon model with identical households, which demand money due to a liquidity constraint. Money is supplied in form of outright sales/purchases and repurchase agreements, where money and interest bearing securities are exchanged. The amount of money supplied in open market operations equals the discounted value of eligible securities. Households can decide on whether to carry over money from one period to the other or to repurchase the securities. The former corresponds to the conventional specication of money, where it is treated as a store of value, while money that is held under repurchase agreements serves as a pure medium of exchange. Households are indi¤erent between the two types of money holdings, which allows to simplify the analysis by focussing on the case where money is exclusively held under repurchase agreements. 4 Households nancial wealth comprises claims on other households and government bonds carried over from the previous period. We explicitly take into account that real world central banks are typically character-ized by restrictions on their asset acquisition policy (see, e.g., Kopcke, 2002) . In particular, eligible securities are usually constrained to a set of assets with high credit quality in order to avoid any credit risk in the central banks portfolio and opportunities for political pressure to inuence the allocation of credit (see Meyer, 2001 ). The US Federal Reserve, for example, exclusively accepts securities issued by the Treasury, federal agencies, as well as acceptances and bank bills, which meet high credit quality standards (see Meulendyke, 1998) . Recent asset acquisition policy of the US Federal Reserve can even be summarized as Treasuriesonly (see Broaddus and Goodfriend, 2001 ). In the model, a legal restriction is imposed, which constrains money supply in that only government bonds can be used in open market operations. The crucial assumption is that households internalize not only the goods market (cash-in-advance) constraint, but also this money market constraint when they decide on their optimal plan. Then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium where private debt yields a higher interest than public debt and the money market restriction is binding, such that the outstanding stock of government bonds relates to the amount of money supplied in open market operations and exhibits a liquidity value. 5 In order to facilitate comparisons with the New Keynesian theory, which serves as the predominant framework in the recent literature on monetary policy analysis, the model further allows for prices to be set by monopolistically competitive (retail) rms in a staggered way. When there is no legal restriction on open market operations, the reduced set of linearized equilibrium conditions is isomorphic to the standard New Keynesian model applied in Clarida et al. (1999) . In case there is a binding legal restriction on eligible securities, the model exhibits substantial di¤erences. In particular, a monetary injection then reduces the nominal discount rate regardless whether prices are exible or sticky. Hence, it generates the liquidity e¤ect, for example, reported by Hamilton (1997) or Christiano et al. (1999) , which can hardly be reproduced by conventional sticky price models, where the nominal interest rate tends to increase with money supply due to higher expected ination (see Christiano et al., 1997) . While it is known that this so-called liquidity puzzle can at least temporarily be solved by allowing for segmentations and information asymmetries in asset markets (see Lucas, 1990 , Fuerst, 1992 , and Alvarez et al., 2002 , the emergence of the liquidity e¤ect in this paper relies on the availability of eligible securities. Due to the assumption that the issuance of public debt is constrained to ensure government solvency, 6 a rise in the supply of money must necessarily be accompanied by a decline in its relative price, i.e., the nominal 5 Liquidity or transaction services of government bonds are assumed in a more direct way in Bansal and Coleman (1996) , Canzoneri et al. (2000) , or Lahiri and Vegh (2003) . 6 In other words, the sequence of tax receipts and, thus, public liabilities are restricted to induce a Ricardian scal policy regime. discount (repo) rate. When prices are set in a staggered way, the model further predicts real activity to increase and the spread between the interest rates on private and public debt to decrease with a monetary expansion, if households are risk-averse. Hence, the spread can be interpreted as a liquidity premium on non-eligible securities, contributing to the solution for Weils (1989) risk-free rate puzzle in the spirit of Bansal and Colemans (1996) explanation.
When the central bank is assumed to control the nominal discount (repo) rate, which equals the interest rate on government bonds, the analysis discloses that well-known determinacy properties of conventional models relate to the irrelevance of open market operations therein. In particular, an interest rate peg accompanied by an unrestricted money supply leaves (for exible prices) the price level and (for sticky prices) the rational expectations equilibrium path indetermined, in accordance with the results of Kerr and King (1996) and Benhabib et al. (2001) . Hence, these ndings a¢rm that a monetary policy regime with no e¤ective limit to the quantity of money, which can be interpreted as a central bank applying the real bills doctrine (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) , is prone to non-uniqueness of prices and equilibria, as shown by Sargent and Wallace (1982) , McCallum (1986 ), or Smith (1988 . On the other hand, if there is a binding legal restriction on the supply of money, nominal interest rate policy is always associated with an uniquely determined price level and an unique rational expectations equilibrium. 7 In particular, equilibrium uniqueness does not require the fulllment of the so-called Taylor-principle, as it would in the case where open market operations are irrelevant (see Woodford, 2001) , implying that the central bank can already stabilize the economy by setting the nominal interest rate rather than being compelled to control the real interest rate. However, when the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on changes in ination, it should refrain from adjusting the interest rate in an extreme way when debt interest payments are not completely tax nanced. Otherwise, it would strongly burden public debt obligations, which by interfering with interest rate policy might give rise to a divergent equilibrium path. 8 Macroeconomic stability then requires monetary policy to account for the evolution of public debt.
The stability analysis discloses another implication of the money market constraint, which is concerned with the structural relations between interest rates, money supply, and ination.
Regarding the relation between money supply and the rate of ination, one would expect sensible policy behavior to involve a negative value (see McCallum, 1999) . According to 7 Given that tax policy is assumed to ensure government solvency, these ndings do not relate to determinacy results in Woodford (1994) or Benhabib et al. (2001) for the case where scal policy is specied in a nonRicardian way. 8 The destabilizing e¤ect of aggressive interest rate policy via debt-interest spirals is also found by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) in a framework where public debt is non-neutral due to overlapping generations. this view, a central bank that aims at stabilizing ination should implement a sequence of money growth rates, which are negatively related to the sequence of ination rates, as for example found by Ireland (2003) for the US Federal Reserve policy, whereas a positive relation indicating an accommodating money supply does not seem to be consistent with this aim. Within our theoretical framework, it is always possible to identify interest rate rules that are associated with sequences of non-accommodating money growth rates. However, without a legal restriction on money supply an interest rate policy that induces equilibrium (multiplicity) determinacy is accompanied by a sequence of money growth rates, which are (decreasing) increasing with ination. In contrast, if the legal restriction is binding a simple equivalence principle applies, predicting that a central bank can use non-accommodating money supply or interest rate rules interchangeably without a¤ecting determinacy or altering the equilibrium sequences. 9 Hence, a binding legal restriction on eligible securities in open market operations allows a central bank to implement its money market rate target via a limited supply of reserves and to switch between operating targets leaving the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates unchanged.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In section 3 we present results for the exible and sticky prices. Section 4 concludes and discusses some further implications.
The model
Identical and innitely lived household-rm units are endowed with government bonds, money, and claims on other households carried over from the previous period. They produce a wholesale good employing labor from all households. Aggregate uncertainty is due to monetary policy shocks, which are realized at the beginning of the period. Then goods are There, the supplied amount of money equals the discounted value of interest bearing assets, which are deposited at the central bank. 10 Then the goods market opens. After goods have been traded, households can repurchase the securities from the central bank. The remaining amount of money is carried over to the next period. To allow for a nominal rigidity, monopolistically competitive retail rms are introduced that di¤erentiate the wholesale goods and 9 An analysis of a switch between operating targets in the context of a liquidity trap can be found in Benhabib et al. (2002) .
1 0 Equivalently, it can be assumed that nancial intermediaries or traders engage in open market operations on the behalf of the households.
set their prices in a staggered way. As a consequence, the log-linear approximation of the model nests the standard New Keynesian model presented in Clarida et al. (1999) .
Households Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. There is an innite number of time periods ! (! = 0" 1" 2" ###). Let $ ! = ($ 0 " ####" $ ! ) denote the history of events up to date ! and %($ ! j$ !¡1 ) denote probability of state $ ! and, thus, of the history $ ! conditional on the history $ !¡1 at date ! ¡ 1. The initial state, $ 0 , is given so that %($ 0 ) = 1. There is a continuum of perfectly competitive household-rm units distributed uniformly over 
and sells the wholesale good to retail rms charging a price , $ ($ ! _ ) per unit. Household & is assumed to maximize the expected value of the discounted stream of utility stemming from consumption and leisure, which is given by
where -denotes the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function . is assumed to be strictly increasing in consumption ', strictly decreasing in working time (, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable with respect to both arguments, satises the usual Inada conditions, and is additively separable.
We separate the household problem into a intratemporal and an intertemporal part. In the intratemporal part they make their optimal decisions on production and on the composition of consumption. Prot maximizing leads to the following demand for labor ( # (*" $ ! ) :
where , ($ ! ) denotes the aggregate price level and /($ ! ) the real wage rate. Let '(&" $ ! ) be consumption of a composite good which is dened as a CES aggregate of di¤erentiated goods
, which are bought from retailers indexed with
" )1" where 2 3 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two retail goods. Let , (1" $ ! ) denote the price of the retail good 0(1" $ ! ) and the price of the composite good , ($ ! ) be given
Minimizing costs for purchasing a unit of the composite good leads to the following optimal demand for the retail good 0 # (1" $ ! ) :
The intertemporal part unfolds as follows. In what follows the index & is except for the supply side variables disregarded, for convenience, as households are identical. At the beginning of period ! households are endowed with nancial wealth 4($ !¡1 ), which comprises government bonds holdings 5($ !¡1 ), claims on other households 6($ !¡1 ), and money holdings operations, where they can exchange interest bearing assets 5 ) ($ ! ) for money additions 9($ ! ).
The amount 9($ ! ) supplied by the central bank equals the discounted value 5 ) ($ ! ):8($ ! ) :
Hence, the exchange (repo) rate in open market operations equals the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds. The exchange restriction (5) is assumed to hold for two types of open market operations, namely outright sales and purchases as well as repurchase agreements. The fraction of money traded via repurchase agreements, which is denoted by 7 * ($ ! ), is only held until the end of the period, when the repurchase agreements are settled.
Hence, 7 * ($ ! ) is a ow variable and can be interpreted as inside money, as it is the counterpart of securities temporarily deposited at the central bank. Money injections thus satisfy
After households have traded with the central bank, they enter the goods market. Here, they rely on the total amount of money 7($ ! )´7 ' ($ ! ) + 7 * ($ ! ), i.e., money held under outright sales/purchases 7 ' ($ ! ) and held under repurchase agreements 7 * ($ ! ), and on checkable non-interest bearing accounts at a nancial intermediary as means of payment.
1 1 This feature will particularly be helpful to derive the models properties in an analytical way.
These accounts consist of the individual labor income
Hence, purchases of goods are subject to the following liquidity constraint:
The modication of the Clower (1967) constraint, i.e., the term in the square brackets, is primarily introduced to avoid the cash-credit good distortion between consumption and leisure. 12
Applying a standard cash-in-advance constraint causes the nominal interest rates to distort the optimal consumption-leisure decision of households. While the main results in this paper are not a¤ected by this distortion, it would exacerbate the intended comparison with conventional sticky price models, given that the nominal interest rate would then enter the aggregate supply constraint, i.e., the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The avoidance of this distortion is in fact responsible for the model to nest the standard New Keynesian model, as applied in Clarida et al. (1999) .
Households receive cash by selling the wholesale good +(&" $ ! ) to retail rms and retail
, and have to pay a lump sum tax , ($ ! )< ($ ! ). After the goods market is closed, inside money 7 * ($ ! ) is used by the households to repurchase securities from the central bank. Household &s budget constraint is given by
The main novel feature of the model is that the market for money is assumed to be constrained. Considering that asset acquisition of many real world central banks (see Kopcke, 2002) , including the US Federal Reserve, is restricted to a set of high credit quality securities, a legal restriction on open market operations is imposed by which only government bonds are accepted by the central bank as collateral for money:
Such a restriction on the asset acquisition of a central bank is commonly justied by the aim to avoid credit risk in its portfolio and e¤ects on credit allocation (see Meyer, 2001 ).
It actually imposes an upper bound on the supply of money, given by the discounted value 1 2 This specication closely follows Jeanne (1998) .
of total government bonds held by private sector. In the case where the central bank sets the interest rate, the legal restriction can be viewed as the main di¤erence between a money supply regime, as for example applied by the US Federal Reserve in the recent past, and the so-called real bills doctrine, which was applied by the US Federal Reserve during the Great Depression and is characterized by an e¤ectively unlimited quantity of money (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) . According to this doctrine, the nominal interest rate is held at its target, 13 while money is supplied in exchange for short-term commercial bills that are intended to nance real transactions and can, thus, rise in a potentially unbounded way.
It is further assumed that households are aware of the fact that their access to cash is restricted by their holdings of government bonds. This restriction would be irrelevant when they can issue private debt with an interest rate not higher than the interest rate on government bonds. However, as the monetary authority (directly or indirectly) controls the latter, a positive spread 8 ( ($ ! ) 3 8($ ! ) cannot generally be ruled out, so that the households internalize the constraint (8), which can rewritten as
when they derive their optimal decisions. Maximizing (2) subject to the constraints for goods market (6), the asset market (7), the money market (9), a non-negativity constraint on money held under repurchase agreements, 7 * ($ ! )¸0, and a no-Ponzi-game condition
, for a given initial value of total nominal wealth 4($ 0 ) 3 0 leads to the following rst order conditions for consumption, leisure, holdings of private and public debt, and of money, 7 * ($ ! ) and 7 ' ($ ! ) :
.
) denotes the rate of ination, = the shadow price of wealth, > the Lagrange multiplier on the goods market constraint (6), and @ the Lagrange multiplier on the money market constraint (9). The equations (14) and (15) give the rst order conditions for 7 * and 7 ' , respectively, and the multiplier A measures if money is held under repurchase agreements. The households optimum is further characterized by the constraints (6), (7), and (9),
where
, and the no-Ponzi game condition holding with equality, which provides the transversality condition.
Retailer There is a monopolistically competitive retail sector with a continuum of retail
Each retail rm, owned by the households, buys a quantity
To minimize distortions induced by liquidity constraints, it is assumed that households buy coupons for the di¤erentiated consumption goods providing retail rms with cash, which they use to the purchase the wholesale good. We assume that a retailer is able to di¤erentiate the wholesale good without further costs. The di¤erentiated retail good 0(1"
. We assume that retailers set their prices according to Calvos (1983) staggered price setting model. The retailer changes its price when it receives a signal, which arrives in a given period with probability (1 ¡ D), where D 2 [0" 1). A retailer who does not receive a signal adjusts its price by the steady state aggregate ination rate ?, such that
A retailer who receives a price change signal in period ! chooses a price e , (1" $ ! ) to maximize the expected sum of future discounted prot streams given by
real prots in period !+F for own prices not being adjusted after period ! : Maximizing (19) subject to the demand function (4), taking the price , $ ($ ! ) of the wholesale good, the aggregate nal goods price index , ($ ! ) and the initial price level , ($ 0 ) as given, yields the following rst-order condition for e , (1" $ ! )
. Using the simple pricing rule for the remaining fraction D of the rms (, (1" $ ! ) = ?, (1" $ !¡1 )), the price index for the nal good , ! evolves recursively over time. In a symmetric equilibrium the price level satises ,
, which can be rewritten as:
Public sector The public sector consists of a scal and a monetary authority. The monetary authority supplies money in open market operations in exchange for government bonds and transfers the seigniorage to the scal authority. The budget constraint of the central bank is given by
where < ) denotes transfers to the scal authority. We consider two monetary policy regimes, which di¤er with regard to the choice of the operating target being controlled according to simple rules. The rst regime is characterized by the central bank controlling the supply of
). In the second regime, which is analyzed in the last part of the paper, the central bank applies the nominal discount (repo) rate 8($ ! ) as its operating target.
The scal authority issues risk free one period bonds earning a gross nominal interest rate 8($ ! ), collects lump-sum taxes < from the households, and receives the transfer < ) from the monetary authority:
Hence, interest rate payments on public debt are the only source of expenditures for the scal authority. Fiscal policy is assumed to satisfy the following simple rule which relates interest rate payments on outstanding debt to tax receipts and, for simplicity, to transfers from the central bank: 14
The scal policy parameter H governs the portion of government expenditures covered by tax receipts. It thus serves as a measure for scal responsiveness: A high value of H indicates scal austerity and H = 1 a balanced budget regime. Using the scal policy rule (23) to eliminate taxes in the budget constraint (22) leads to the following rule for the supply of 1 4 A similar scal policy rule, that further allows for ! = 0, can be found in Benhabib et al. (2001) . public debt
Hence, a higher value for the scal policy parameter H reduces the growth rate of government bonds. In the subsequent analysis we will focus, for convenience, on the case where money does not serve as a store of value for the households, 7 ' ($ ! ) = 0. As H 3 0 is assumed (see 23), it follows immediately from (24) that solvency of the public sector is guaranteed in this case, as
is always satised. In other words, public policy is Ricardian. It should be noted that this specication of scal policy contrasts the one, for example, applied in Dupor (2001) , where open market operations are dened as government asset exchanges associated with a constant tax policy (see also Smith, 1987, or Schreft and Smith, 1998) , implying that public debt can rise with the nominal interest rate policy, i.e., that public policy is non-Ricardian.
Equilibrium Given that households are identical, in equilibrium 6(
, and as retail rms behave symmetrically:
Denition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium of the model is a set of sequences f=(
satisfying the aggregate version of the production function (1), the labor demand condition (3), the households rst order conditions (10)(18) combined with (6) and (9), the conditions (20), (21), and ?($ ! ) = , ($ ! ):, ($ !¡1 ) for the evolution of aggregate prices, the retail goods production, +($ ! ) = 0($ ! ), the aggregate resource constraint, 0($ ! ) = '($ ! ), the scal policy rule (24), and the transversality condition, for a given monetary policy rule for
In what follows we restrict our attention to the cases where the goods market constraint is binding, '($ ! ) = C($ ! ). For this, the nominal interest rate on government bonds 8($ ! ) will be restricted to be larger than one such that >($ ! ) 3 0.
Results
In this section the role of open market operations for short-run macroeconomic e¤ects of monetary policy is examined. We start by establishing households indi¤erence between accumulating money or holding money (intratemporally) under repurchase agreements. Using this property, the remainder of the paper focuses, for analytical convenience, on the case where Proof. In order to establish the claim in the proposition it has to be shown that the multiplier A ! on the non-negativity constraint 7 * !¸0 is equal to zero. Eliminating the multiplier > ! on the cash constraint (6) in the rst order conditions for money (14) and (15), gives
Further applying the rst order condition for private debt (12) and government bonds (13) proofs that A ! = 0. ¥
The indi¤erence between the two types of money holdings, measured by the multiplier A ! on the non-negativity constraint 7 * !¸0 , critically hinges on the assumption that government bonds are nominally state contingent. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that their payo¤ in period ! equals 8 !¡1 5 !¡1 , implying that they are not nominal (though, still real) state contingent, the multiplier on money holdings under repurchase agreements is in general not equal to zero. Given that the assumed payo¤ structure induces households to be indi¤erent between accumulating money or holding money temporarily, A ! = 0, the following assumption, which substantially simplies the analysis as money becomes a ow variable, will be applied throughout the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 1 Money is exclusively held under repurchase agreements, 7 ' ! = 0 8! 3 0, and the initial value of money held by the households is equal to zero, 7 ' 0 = 0, such that 9 ! = 7 ! = 7 * ! 8!. . In this case, households can borrow to invest costlessly in government bonds to any amount. In contrast, when the interest rate on government bonds is smaller than the interest rate on private debt, this strategy becomes costly and households are willing to minimize holdings of government bonds. Due to the existence of the money market constraint, which reads 7 * ! (= 7 ! )¸5 ! :8 ! under assumption 1, a positive spread 8 ( ! 3 8 ! can arise in equilibrium, which is associated with a liquidity value of government bonds, indicated by a positive multiplier @ ! 3 0. In this case, the money market constraint (9) is binding, 5 ! = 5 ) ! , indicating that households are only willing to hold government bonds equal to the desired amount of money times the current repo rate, 5 ! = 8 ! 7 ! . This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Legal restriction) The money market constraint is binding, 7 ! = 5 ! :8 ! , if the interest rate spread between private and public debt is expected to be positive
Proof. Given that = ! 3 0 is ensured by (10) and (18), the rst order condition (13) 
Money, interest rates, and prices
In this subsection the role of open market operations for the relation of money supply and interest rates is examined under exible prices. Here, we are primarily interested in the ability of the model to generate a liquidity e¤ect, i.e., a decline in the money market rate in response to a monetary injection. While the liquidity e¤ect is commonly found in empirical contributions (see Eichenbaum, 1992 , or Hamilton, 1997 , it can hardly be reproduced in monetary business cycle models, without referring to segmentations or information asymmetries in asset markets (see Lucas, 1990 , Fuerst, 1992 , or Alvarez et al., 2002 . In any case, the success of these strategies to resolve the so-called liquidity puzzle depends on parameter restrictions that decide on the ability of particular e¤ects, brought about by the asset market frictions, to dominate the expected ination e¤ect of a monetary injection, that tends to raise the nominal interest rate. On the contrary, it is shown in this section that an unanticipated increase in money supply is unambiguously associated with a liquidity e¤ect, when the money market constraint is binding.
Consider the case where prices are exible, i.e., the probability of a retailer receiving a price signal is equal to one (D = 0), and that the central bank exogenously controls the supply of money via open market operations. The growth rate, G ! = C ! ? ! :C !¡1 , is assumed to satisfy
where the innovations K ! have an expected value equal to zero and are serially uncorrelated.
It should be noted that the money supply rule is specied in terms of the growth rate to facilitate comparisons to related studies. Given that money is actually a ow variable in our model, it might be more intuitive to specify a money supply rule in levels, which would further simplify the analysis, leaving the main results unchanged.
For the case where prices are exible, the solution for most of the variables can immediately be derived. The real wage rate is constant and equals the inverse of the retailers
& , which immediately implies together with ' ! = 0 ! = ( ! that consumption is uniquely pinned down by (11) and, thus, constant. 16 Further, suppose that the nominal interest rate on government bonds exceeds one, 8 ! 3 1, implying that the cash constraint is binding, C ! = ' ! , and that the rate of ination equals the growth rate of money, ? ! = G ! . Then the response of the nominal interest rate(s) on a money supply shock, K ! 3 0, critically hinges on whether the open market constraint is binding or not.
When, the interest rate spread is expected to be equal to zero, 8 ! = 8 ( ! , the money market constraint is irrelevant, @ ! = 0. Combining the rst order conditions for money (14) and (15), which then reads > ! = (8 ! ¡ 1) = ! , for consumption (10) and for bonds (12), gives the consumption Euler equation
Given that consumption is constant, the nominal interest rates satisfy 8
Hence, for serially correlated money growth rates, L 3 0, an expansionary money supply shock leads to a rise in the money market rate, due to the so-called expected ination e¤ect (see Christiano et al., 1997) . If, on the other hand, the money market constraint is binding, an inverse relation between money supply and the money market rate arises. For a liquidity e¤ect to occur, it is, however, crucial that scal policy is assumed to be Ricardian, i.e., to ensure government solvency by satisfying H 3 0.
Suppose that the spread 8 ( ! ¡8 ! is positive, implying that the money market constraint is binding, 7 ! = 5 ! :8 ! . Then the stock of government bonds outstanding relates to the supply of money and, for a binding goods market constraint, ' ! = C ! , to consumption expenditures,
Applying the supply rule for government bonds (24), which reads in real terms
, and using that consumption is constant under exible prices, leads to the following relation between money supply and the nominal discount rate 8 :
Specifying the money supply rule in form of Alvarez et al. (2002) where money is also not accumulated, would instead lead to a non-backward looking relation, which might be more intuitive as the nominal interest rate is a jump variable. Nevertheless, equation (27) reveals that a rise in the money growth rate G ! is associated with a decline in the nominal interest rate 8 ! , provided that we assumed the scal authority to satisfy H 3 0.
If, however, H = 0 would be assumed, which implies that scal policy is non-Ricardian, then a money injection would leave the current interest rate unchanged. A non-zero feedback from debt to taxes, H 3 0, thus serves as a bound for the supply of eligible securities and is therefore responsible for the price of money, i.e., the nominal discount rate, to decline when money supply rises.
In order to derive the solution for the nominal interest rate, we apply the log-linear approximation to the model at the steady state. A variable with a bar denotes the particular steady state value. The steady state is characterized by constant values for '" ?" I" C" 8 ( It should be noted that the scal policy constraint, H¸1 ¡ -, which is imposed to guarantee that the upper bound e G is non-negative, is hardly restrictive. The upper (lower) bound on the average money growth rate ensures the money (goods) market constraint to be binding in the steady state. Suppose that public policy satises the conditions in proposition 3 and that the support of K is su¢ciently small such that the money market constraint always binds, Then, at the steady state the fundamental solution of the model can be shown to be the unique solution according to the criterion of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) . Given that the nominal interest rate is not a predetermined variable, this requires the di¤erence equation (27) Proposition 4 (Liquidity e¤ect) The fundamental solution of the log-linear approximation to the model at the steady state with @ 3 0, 8 3 1 and G¸1 is the unique solution and generates a liquidity e¤ect by:
Proof. Log-linearizing (27) at the steady state with @ 3 0 and > 3 0, leads to b whether the money market constraint is binding or not. In the latter case both interest rates are identical, whereas the repo rate behaves inversely in the former case. It will be shown in the following subsection that the nominal interest rate 8 ( will also decrease with money supply when prices are not completely exible.
The fundamental solution for the nominal interest rate given in (29) further implies that there exists a simple relation between the applied money supply rule (25) and an exogenous interest rate policy: An interest rate peg is equivalent to a constant money growth policy.
This property leads to the last result in this subsection, which concerns the determination of the price level. As it is well known, interest rate policy can easily lead to price level indeterminacy, if it does not react to the state of the economy. In particular, an interest rate peg is commonly associated with price level indeterminacy if scal policy is assumed to be Ricardian (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001) , as in this model. A constant money growth rule, however, di¤ers with regards to its determinacy implications, as shown by Fuerst (2001, 2003) , and provides a nominal anchor facilitating the determination of the price level. In this model, the existence of a nominal anchor rather depends on wether the money market constraint is binding or not, than on the type of monetary policy rule. Given that, an interest rate peg is equivalent to a constant money growth rule for a binding money market constraint, price level determinacy is always ensured. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Price level determinacy) Suppose that the cash constraint is binding and that the central bank pegs the nominal discount rate 8 ! = 8. Then the price level is (in)determined if the money market constraint is (not) binding. operations, which allows to determine the current real value of nancial wealth which is predetermined in nominal terms. 18 Hence, the legal restriction on money supply resolves the problem of price level indeterminacy, which occurs when the nominal interest rate is pegged and money supply is unbounded. The latter case can also be interpreted as a monetary policy regime following the real bills doctrine (see McCallum, 1986) . Hence, our nding corresponds to the results in Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Smith (1988) , showing that a monetary policy under the real bills doctrine leads to indeterminacies of prices and equilibria in overlapping generations models, whereas legal restrictions on money and credit markets are able to restore determinacy. As, however, stressed by Sargent and Wallace (1982) , a LaissezFaire regime can be welfare enhancing, indicating that given that such restrictions, when they are binding, misallocate resources, it follows that there can be a trade-o¤ between achieving price level stability and achieving e¢cient resource allocation through credit markets (see Wallace, 1983 ). In our model with exible prices, consumption and leisure are constant and identical for both cases, implying that an equilibrium with a legal restriction regime is not Pareto-dominated. This property, which does not necessary apply to the case where prices are rigid, will, however, not further be examined in this paper.
Monetary policy under staggered price setting
In order to extend the previous analysis for the case where prices are exible, we assume in this section that prices are set in a staggered way, D 3 0, in accordance with numerous contributions to the recent monetary policy literature (see e.g. Clarida et al. 1999 , or Woodford, 2003 . On the one hand, the responses to a monetary policy shock should be more realistic than for exible prices. One the other hand, we expect the properties regarding the price level determination (see proposition 5) to carry over to the determinacy of real variables and, thus, of the rational expectations equilibrium if prices are not completely exible. The model then additionally features an aggregate supply constraint stemming from the partial price adjustments of retailers. Log-linearizing (20) and (21), the evolution of the ination rate can be summarized by the following constraint, i.e., the so-called New Keynesian Phillips
, ! (= / ! ) denotes the retailers real marginal costs. The equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the model at a steady state with 8 3 1, P´¡. ) :(. )) ') 3 0" and Q´. -:(. --() 3 0, for the monetary policy rule (29) with G¸0, which can for @ ! 3 0 either be interpreted as an exogenous rule for the nominal interest rate or the money growth rate, is dened as follows.
Denition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the sticky price model at the steady state with P, Q 3 0, 8 3 1, and G¸0 is a set of sequences {b
, and the transversality condition for a given initial value I 0 = 4 0 :, 0 3 0.
The equilibrium conditions listed in Denition 2 reveal that real nancial wealth, i.e., the real value of government bonds outstanding, only a¤ects consumption and ination in the case where open market operations matter (@ ! 3 0). Otherwise (@ ! = 0), the equilibrium sequences of consumption, ination, real balances, and the nominal interest rate are completely una¤ected by real wealth, since they can already be determined by (29)-(31). The model, given by (30)-(31) and a Taylor-rule instead of (29), is in fact isomorphic to the New Keynesian models, as for example applied in Clarida et al. (1999) or in Woodford (2003) .
The public nancing decision, which is represented by the feedback parameter H governing the ratio of tax to debt nancing, is therefore irrelevant implying that Ricardian equivalence applies. As the model with @ ! = 0 is characterized by a real bond (wealth) indeterminacy (see Canzoneri and Diba, 2000) , condition (32) is then irrelevant for the equilibrium.
In what follows the e¤ects to a monetary policy shock K ! , where
examined for the version with a binding money market constraint, @ ! 3 0, given in Denition 2. In this case, b G ! 3 0 measures a money injection associated with an immediate decline in the nominal discount rate, given that (29) provides the fundamental solution for the nominal discount rate regardless whether prices are sticky or exible. 20 This version of the model exhibits exactly one relevant predetermined variable, namely, real nancial wealth I !¡1 = 4 !¡1 :, !¡1 , such that the state space is given by
where 
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to the properties of the fundamental solution presented in proposition 6, the models predictions about monetary policy e¤ects on real activity and prices qualitatively accord to evidence from vector autoregressions, as presented in Christiano et al. (1999) . To be more precise, part (i) of proposition 6 predicts that consumption (output) and real balances decline in response to a monetary contraction, b G ! M 0, whereas part (ii) reveals that the price reaction is not unambiguous. For ination to decline in response to a monetary contraction, the degree of scal responsiveness should be su¢ciently large, H 3 H. For example, the parameter values -= 0#99, D = 0#75" and P = Q = 3 lead to H ' 0#5. Otherwise, the associated rise in the nominal interest rate on government bonds (see part (iv)), can cause the treasury to increase nominal debt. A stationary sequence of public debt would then require the ination rate to rise in the future to deate public debt. As retailers set their prices in a forward looking way, ination would then also rise in the impact period. Hence, a small value for the feedback of debt on taxes, H M H, provides an alternative explanation for an inverse price response to a monetary policy shock, which is commonly found in vector autoregressions, and known as the price-puzzle (see Sims, 1991) .
The model further predicts that real wealth rises in response to a monetary contraction (see part (iii) of proposition 6), which is mainly caused by the rise in the repo rate due to the existence of the liquidity e¤ect (see part (iv)). Regarding the return on private debt, part (v) of proposition 6 also discloses that b 8 ( ! rises in response to a monetary contraction if the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1:P is su¢ciently large. Moreover, the solutions for b 8 ! and b
which is ensured for risk-averse households, P 3 1. Given that only government bonds can be exchanged for money in open market operations, this spread can be interpreted as a liquidity premium and behaves in an intuitive way: A decline in money supply raises the willingness of risk-averse households to liquidate their securities, such that the liquidity value of government bonds and, thus, the premium on private debt rises.
Corollary 1 A binding money market constraint is associated with an endogenous liquidity premium if households are risk-avers.
For the last part of this section, the central bank is assumed to endogenously adjust the nominal discount rate. In particular, interest rate setting is considered to depend on the realizations of the current ination rate
which is commonly assumed in recent studies on the determinacy properties of interest rate policy (see Benhabib et al., 2001 , 2002 , Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001 , or Dupor, 2001 , and can be viewed as a simplied version of the rule proposed by Taylor (1993) . As prices are rigid, stabilization of ination rates is in fact a welfare enhancing policy strategy (see Woodford, 2003) , which implies that the ination elasticity L 5 should be positive, if scal policy is su¢ciently responsive, H 3 H. Otherwise, a rise in the nominal interest rate intended to stabilize ination can cause the opposite, as shown in part (ii) of proposition 6. Hence, a binding money market constraint gives rise to an interaction of scal and monetary policy such that an optimal policy analysis might to be more challenging in this environment. 22 In this paper, however, we do not aim to assess the implications of the legal restriction for households welfare and continue with the analysis of the local dynamic properties. While an interest rate peg was shown to ensure to saddle path stability (see proposition 6), the same property is not guaranteed for the case where the nominal interest rate is set highly reactive to changes in ination. In particular, the upper bound for an ination elasticity, which ensures saddle path stability, depends on the scal responsiveness, measured by the feedback parameter H of the tax rule (23). The determinacy properties are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Real determinacy) Suppose that the central bank sets the nominal discount rate according to (34) . Then the rational expectations equilibrium path of the model in Denition 2 with a binding money market constraint is (i) uniquely determined, and (ii) stable if and only if
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to part (i) of proposition 7, the model with a binding money market constraint is in any case associated with a unique rational expectation equilibrium, including a peg L 5 = 0, which has already been established in proposition 6. Hence, in contrast to the case where the money market constraint is not binding, the Taylor-principle (L 5 3 1) is neither necessary nor su¢cient for real determinacy. In the latter case, L 5 3 1 avoids a non-fundamentally induced rise in expected ination to induce a decline in the real interest rate that would lead to a rise in current consumption and, thus, in ination, which would cause the initial expectation to become self-fullling (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001) . When the money market constraint is binding, there is another mechanism which rules out sunspot equilibria. A rise in ination leads in this case to a decrease in real nancial wealth by (32) and, as condition (30) implies consumption to rise with real wealth, to a decline in aggregate demand given that the nominal interest rate is non-decreasing in ination (see 34). Hence, the aggregate demand response tends to lower current ination by the aggregate supply constraint (31), such that ination expectations cannot be self-fullling.
To get an intuition for the result in part (ii) in proposition 7, consider that the central bank chooses a high ination elasticity L 5 and that ination rises due to a fundamental shock.
If tax policy is highly reactive to the evolution of public debt (high H), then the real value of public debt will be reduced by higher prices. If, on the other hand, the scal policy regime nances only a small fraction of its debt obligations by taxes (low H), then the associated rise in the nominal interest rate 8 ! can lead to a rise in real public debt. This, however, corresponds to a rise in the real value of eligible securities held by the households. Thus, households raise their consumption expenditures, since the increase in public debt eases the money market constraint. As the rise in aggregate demand further feeds ination by (31) the initial inationary impulse is enhanced. Hence, a highly aggressive interest rate policy might lead to explosive paths when the scal feedback is too small. 23 The upper bound L 5
given in proposition 7 further reveals that it is su¢cient for saddle path stability if the scal authority runs a balanced budget policy (H = 1 ) L 5 = 1) or if the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in a passive way (L 5 M 1). 24
The stability analysis reveals another remarkable property, which regards the relation of interest rates and money supply. As already shown in proposition 4, there is a simple equivalence principle between interest rates and money supply when the money market constraint is binding. It predicts, that an interest rate rule (34) is associated with a money growth rate which is negatively related to current ination. Hence, this monetary policy regime can equivalently be described by a money supply rule with a negative ination elasticity rule, 
According to (35), an active interest rate setting, L 5 3 1, is associated with accommodating money growth rates Ub G ! :Ub ? ! 3 0. On the contrary, an interest rate rule which is accompanied by a non-accommodating money supply, violates the so-called Taylor principle and as shown by Woodford (2001) in an isomorphic model allows for multiple rational expectations equilibria. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (Equivalence) A sequence of nominal discount rates satisfying (34) can only be associated with a sequence of non-accommodating money growth rates Ub G ! :Ub ? ! · 0 on an unique rational expectations equilibrium path if the money market constraint is binding.
In general, one should expect the money supply of a central bank, which aims at stabilizing the economy, to exhibit a non-positive feedback from ination (see, e.g., McCallum, 1999) .
Such a money supply regime should for example according to Irelands (2003) 
Conclusion
Are open market operations really irrelevant for macroeconomic dynamics, as usually presumed in recent business cycle theory? In this paper it is shown that, when money is the counterpart of discounted securities deposited at the central bank, the relevance of open market operations depends on whether the set of eligible securities is constrained or not. Given that scal policy is assumed to be Ricardian such that the supply of eligible securities is not unbounded, money is inversely related to the nominal discount interest rate and a cash injection is associated with a liquidity e¤ect.
Besides its potential to resolve the liquidity and the risk-free-rate puzzle, a binding legal restriction on eligible securities facilitates the unique determination of the price level and the rational expectation equilibrium for interest rate policies, which are associated with indeterminacies when money supply is unrestricted. The reason for this property is that households nancial wealth (public debt) is relevant, as it serves as a collateral for money, and provides a nominal anchor that allows to pin down the price level even for an interest rate peg. The determinacy ndings can, therefore, be viewed as a rationale for central banks to impose a restriction on eligible securities rather than to follow an asset acquisition policy in the way recommended by the real bills doctrine, which implies money supply to be e¤ectively unlimited. On the other hand, a policy regime with a binding restriction is likely to be dominated in terms of welfare by a Laissez-Faire regime, as it potentially leads to a misallocation of resources. Hence, the introduction of the money market restriction can be associated with a trade-o¤ between determinacy and optimality. A sensible analysis concerning this trade-o¤, which is beyond the scope of this paper, might however require a more realistic environment where price rigidities are not the only macroeconomic distortion.
The analysis further reveals a major di¤erence between both regimes that matters for the implementation of interest rate targets. In particular, an interest rate rule, which is aimed to stabilize the economy, implies a non-accommodating money supply only if the legal restriction is binding, while it is associated with money growth rates that rise with ination if money supply is unrestricted. Moreover, a central bank that aims at implementing its money market rate target via the supply of reserves through open market operations relies in the latter case on its ability to assess the amount of money demanded at the particular real interest rate, that actually links the operating target with aggregate demand. This, however, demands the nominal interest rate to be jointly targeted with the ination rate, as implied by a Taylor-type (1993) interest rate rule. If the central bank, on the other hand, imposes a legal restriction, a direct relation between money supply and the nominal interest rate arises, which is only (quantitatively) a¤ected by the outstanding stock of eligible securities.
Hence, the less certain a central bank is about the relation between aggregate demand and the nominal interest rate, the more it should aim to be in control of the assets in open market operations.
Appendix A: Proof of proposition 6
In order to examine the eigenvalues of the model with @ ! 3 0 given in Denition 2, it is reduced to a 2 £ 2 system in real wealth, which is a predetermined variable, and ination:
where M . Given that V(0) is equal to 1:-and, therefore, strictly positive and V(1) is negative V(1) = ¡R 1 :-M 0" the model exhibits one eigenvalue lying between zero and one, ¤ 1 2 (0" 1) and one unstable eigenvalue, ¤ 2 3 1.
As there is only a single stable eigenvalue, the fundamental solution is the unique solution of the model. Using the general form in (33) to replace the endogenous variables in the equilibrium equations (30) 
